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Definition of Key Acronyms: 
 
1. APT  – Arbitrage Pricing Theory; 
2. AR  – Abnormal Returns; 
3. BBBEE - Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment; 
4. BEE - Black Economic Empowerment; 
5. BHAR - Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns; 
6. CAR  - Cumulative Abnormal Returns; 
7. CAAR - Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns; 
8. CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing Model; 
9. CGP - Codes of Good Practice; 
10. E&Y - Ernst & Young; 
11. FDI - Foreign Direct Investment; 
12. JSE - Johannesburg Stock Exchange; 
13. M&A - Mergers and Acquisitions; and 

















The purpose of this study is to evaluate the financial impact of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) transaction announcements on shareholder value. The study 
investigated 49 BEE transactions (classified as 28 disposals, 9 acquisitions, 9 employee share 
schemes and 3 broad based schemes) over a testing period of 72 months between 2000 and 
2008. 
 
The results of the full sample suggests that investor sentiment is positive regarding BEE 
announcements as is seen by the positive CAAR’s at event date of 0.84% and months +12 of 
2.52%. However, when controlling for size and transaction type the degree of positivity 
varies.  
 
Small cap companies outperform large cap companies. The results suggest that small cap 
companies tend to favour acquisitions as a means of improving their BEE credentials. Thus 
the better results of small cap companies is driven by the fact that acquisitions create the most 
value over the long term, with a 36 month CAAR of 4.42%. ESS schemes are considered 
value destroying as ESS earn negative CAAR’s throughout the testing period to +36 months. 
The CAAR plots of both disposals and BBBEE share many similarities and this is expected 
because in fundamental structure they are the same. The CAAR plot of BBBEE schemes 
however is more positive over the event period to +21 months. Although both earn positive 
CAAR’s, BBBEE creates more value over the same time period. This indicates that the 
market has a more positive outlook on and rewards companies that engage in broad based 
schemes.  
 
Companies should look to employ an investment type approach only when looking to invest 
in BEE. This will ensure that BEE commitments conform with current business operations 
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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the financial impact of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) transaction announcements on shareholder value. Companies invest in 
BEE to improve their BEE credentials thereby improving their corporate image and 
unlocking increased future operational opportunities. Regardless of their form, BEE 
transactions represent both an investment and financing decision to the company which 
usually result in large changes in company ownership. This study looks to evaluate the 
impact of BEE announcements by analysing the share price reaction at announcement date, 
+12 months, +24 months and +36 post announcement dates – noting that share price changes 
are driven by shareholder sentiment.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the impact of BEE transactions on shareholders will be 
compared to that of other ownership transactions. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) account 
for the majority of ownership transactions and as such the impact of BEE transactions on 
shareholder value will be compared to similar M&A studies.  
 
BEE transactions cannot be strictly classified as mergers or acquisitions because BEE 
transactions also include the disposal of shares to BEE partners. However the underlying 
principle is the same in that they all result in large changes in ownership. Thus given that the 
purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact on shareholders of the transaction itself, the 
linkage to similar M&A studies is appropriate.  
 
BEE deals typically involve the acquisition or formation of new BEE entities, or the disposal 
of ownership to BEE partners. The mechanics of each transaction may vary however the end 
goal is the same in that they all look to transfer ownership to BEE participants. For the most 



















1.1.1. Acquisitions – Companies acquire or form new BEE companies or joint ventures 
in order to improve the company’s or group’s BEE credentials. Acquisitions 
would typically derive BEE points from all elements of the scorecard, other than 
from the transfer of ownership; 
 
1.1.2. Disposals – Companies sell off equity, usually at a discount to market prices, to 
BEE partners. Throughout the 1990’s this was common and involved a few large 
BEE consortiums such as the Mvelaphanda and PEU Groups. Typically these 
groups were not considered to be broad based and as such wide spread 
ownership was limited to only a few. Special purpose vehicles (SPV’s) were 
used to structure these deals where the company would transfer shares to the 
SPV. The BEE participant would leverage the shares against the underlying 
loans and would look to pay off the loan through any dividends paid. This type 
of transaction, where only an elite few gained, was not sustainable as post 2000 
there was a much bigger drive by government to make these deals more broad 
based; 
 
1.1.3. Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Schemes (BBBEE) - BBBEE deals 
involve shares being on offer to qualifying BEE participants, usually broad 
based groups or the public, at a discount to market prices. The imperative being 
that transactions need to be broad based with widespread ownership; and  
 
1.1.4. Employee Share Schemes (ESS) – The rationale for these schemes is the transfer 
of ownership to existing employees. These schemes were used to incentivise 
employees work performance. 
 
Other than with acquisitions, the underlying principle is the same in that ownership, 
regardless of price, has been transferred to BEE participants.  Acquisitions result in an 
indirect transfer of ownership, because the new BEE Company or joint venture results in 

















In order to fully understand and evaluate the value proposition of BEE announcements it is 
important to analyse how investors have reacted to other similar announcements – such as 
with other M&A announcements. Given the similarities and linkages between BEE deals and 
M&A, investor reaction to M&A announcements will be used as a base for comparison 
purposes.   
 
What is important is that shareholder sentiment determines the value creation, if any, of 
mergers, acquisitions and disposals. It is this sentiment that we look to evaluate to determine 
the impact of BEE transactions - because investor sentiment is indifferent between the forms 
of the transaction.  
 
Due to the fact that BEE is a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa (SA), there are few 
published studies that evaluate the financial implications of BEE transactions on shareholder 
value. Before focussing specifically on BEE transactions, it is useful to consider the nature of 
traditional ownership transactions.  The successful strategies and business models which 
create value in ownership transactions will generate a framework on which successful BEE 
transactions will be modelled.  The study also considers the common factors underlying BEE 
deals that have failed as well as those factors underlying deals that have succeeded. This will 
ensure that not only do we have a comprehensive understanding of what was required for 


















1.2 Study Aims and Objectives: 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of BEE transactions on shareholder value. 
As mentioned previously, there are limited studies in this area. The majority of these studies 
have limitations such as small samples sizes and simplified methodology. Ward and Muller 
(2010) examined the impact of BEE announcements on the share price movements of 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). They used robust standard 
event study methodologies that have withstood academic scrutiny. Their research examined 
188 announcements and they found a positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
approximately 10% for the first year post announcement. This positive return was confined to 
smaller companies with market capitalisation of less than R3.5 billion, whilst larger 
companies showed a marginally negative cumulative return. 
 
This study looks to extend the work performed by Ward and Muller (2010) by evaluating the 
financial implications of BEE announcements over a longer period of time (3 years). 
Analysing the results over a period of 3 years from announcement date will allow this study 
to determine the following: 
 
1. Whether the market has a positive or negative sentiment to the announcement of a BEE 
transaction for the acquiring firm. This will be established by evaluating the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement date; and 
 















1.3 Understanding Ownership Transactions - Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
M&A studies will be incorporated into this study for comparison purposes due to the 
similarities between BEE and M&A transactions, being large transfers of ownership. For this 
reason further understanding of M&A transactions is required. 
 
Globally, and certainly from a South African point of view, the terms merger, acquisition and 
takeover are used interchangeably. While there are technical differences that have been 
established for accounting and legal purposes, however from an economic stand point they 
are not easily distinguished.  
 
It is the characteristics of the underlying transaction that are somewhat different. Mergers are 
typically considered “friendly” transactions, whereas takeovers, usually in the form of tender 
offer, tend to be more aggressive in nature. This distinction is made even more subjective, as 
the difference is often based on the relationships betwe n the acquiring and incumbent 
management. Where the management style involves the domination of the target 
management, then typically the transaction would be considered a takeover. This is often the 
case where one of the factors driving the transaction was considered to be the inefficiency 
and incompetence of the target management. Where transactions result in both management 
teams working together, as equals, then the transaction is typically described as a merger. 
BEE transactions cannot inherently be considered hostile and as such the majority of BEE 
acquisitions would be considered mergers. However, for the rest of this study, these 
transactions will be globally referred to as M&A, and simply describe the transaction where 
one company (the acquirer) takes over another company (the target).  
 
M&A are typically classified into three different categories; horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate transactions. Strategically, horizontal BEE transactions allow the combined 
firm to achieve synergistic efficiencies through market power and/or economies of scale. 
Companies with higher BEE profiles result in a greater market power because of the 
additional potential benefits of being more BEE compliant. Greater BEE profiles result in 
reduced competition. Economies of scale might be achieved through the streamlining of 
similar operations and knowhow. Vertical M&A refers to transactions which enable the 














acquisition of suppliers which guarantees supply and downward transactions refer to the 
acquisition of customers. Thus the pioneering BEE firm has the potential to have a far greater 
degree of control over the whole supply chain.   ('Arnold, 2005b) 
 
Companies looking to expand have the option of growing internally (organically) or 
externally. Organic growth, being less risky, is a slower means of increasing business 
capacity whilst external growth via M&A allows for rapid expansion.  The uncertainty of 
M&A’s makes them risky, but offers management a faster means of achieving their goals. 
Strategically, BEE deals could offer the same level of growth with a reduced level of risk. 
This would be the case where companies purchase the minority interests in established BEE 
compliant companies.  
 
M&A strategy, specifically including BEE, allows the unlocking of synergies that the stand-
alone non BEE compliant company would not have access to. If carefully selected, although 
not exhaustive, the following synergies might be unlocked: 
 
1.3.1. Economies of scale: The combined BEE company allows for efficiencies to 
reduce their per units costs. The increased size and improved BEE profile will 
afford the company more negotiating powers with suppliers; 
 
1.3.2. Reduced fixed costs: Any unwanted or non-value adding assets can be sold. It 
might be the case that there are duplicate buildings, production lines and staffing 
that are no longer required and as such the operations can be streamlined to 
achieve all round efficiencies; 
 
1.3.3. Increased market share: The increased size and improved BEE profile will result 
in the  elimination of potential competitors results in increased market share and 
might enable the company to exercise more control in setting prices; 
 
1.3.4. Efficient resource distribution: Allows for the transfer of resources – knowhow 
and spare capacity in production lines etc.;  
 
1.3.5. Entry to new markets and industries: By the pooling of resources, increased 














to new and greater markets (both geographic and product). At the same time re-
enforcing the barriers to entry; and ('Arnold,  2005b;  'Terjesen) 
 
1.3.6. Identification of locked potential: The acquirer might identify a target as having 
potential due to the following financial and non-financial factors: 
 
1.3.6.1. Excess cash reserves, which if the acquirer had control over then would 
facilitate a better working capital structure; and 
 
1.3.6.2. The target might have incompetent management and thus the restructuring 
of staff might improve financial performance and production efficiencies.     
 
The majority of M&A deals fail to achieve their original expectations yet over the last 
century we have seen a dramatic growth in both the number and value of transactions. This 
begs the questions–what motivates management to adopt an acquisition growth strategy given 
the risks involved despite the fact that achieving pre-deal objectives are unlikely? The Neo-




 centuries, suggests that managers 
of businesses looked to maximize profits so as to maximize shareholder wealth. This is a 
theory that is widely used today to describe the motives of management. However there are 
other factors that require consideration when applying this theory. In the Neo-classical era, 
the majority of business operations were simple and were mostly owner managed. 
Management and owners were one, and as such their goals and objectives were aligned. Thus 
maximising profits for the business meant a maximisation of wealth for the owner. 
 
Today’s business is more complex. Typically larger companies are publicly listed and as such 
there is a split between management (i.e. directors) and owners (i.e. shareholders). 
Shareholders are looking for management to make investment decisions that increase 
shareholder wealth (via the impact on share prices). Management’s objectives and motives 
may be different if they do not have a vested ownership in the company. Management 
incentive programs are driven by company growth in sales, total profits and assets. Thus 
these drivers are key to the underlying reasons for entering into M&A transactions. Although 
not exhaustive, other managerial motives might include agency theory, power of 
bondholders, empire building, status, recognition and power. The hubris hypothesis suggests 














Mistakes are often made by management thinking that they can outsmart the market. (Roll, 
1986) 
 
The motives and objectives of management and shareholders would be aligned if the 
incentives were profit based on indicators such as earnings per share or return on assets. Thus 
logic would suggest that in scenarios where management hold equity, their investment 
strategies should be based on profit maximization. 
 
Bhana (1982) evaluated the motives of the SA’s top 100 firms to determine what their 
takeover objectives were. The results show that 51.6% of the top 100 companies listed on the 
JSE focussed on growth which suggests that management utility is of greater importance than 
the maximization of profit. The research concluded that growth maximization was acceptable 
if it was a short term strategy and that unless profit maximization was the long term objective 
then there would be a conflict between the interests of the shareholder and that of 
management. In another study, Bhana (1983) evaluated the different valuation techniques 
used by the top 100 companies in valuing potential takeover targets. The results of this study 
show that the discounted cash flow technique was not used as a primary means of valuing 
target companies. This result is anomalous given that it is widely accepted that free cash flow 
valuations are robust. Bhana (1983) concluded that from the results that it was evident that 
management did not view acquisitions as an alternative investment option to internal capital 
projects. Thus M&A deals typically were not analysed to ensure the efficient allocation of 
resources thus increasing the risk that M&A’s were not profitable. 
 
On the basis of these research results, investors should weigh up the motives of management 
against the access they may have to inherent business or industry knowledge that investors 
may not have. Growth simply for growth purposes results in inefficiencies and poor 
utilisation of resources. However strategic growth, driven by profit maximisation objectives, 
creates value for the shareholder. Strategic growth with BEE partners provides a platform for 
greater business opportunities and as such offers companies greater profit maximization 
potential. Thus in today’s business environment, the objectives of both management and 















With most M&A transactions not achieving pre-deal expectations it is important to 
understand the potential reasons for the successes and failures.('Sadtler, 2009)The primary 
reasons for M&A failures are: 
 
1. The payment of excessive premiums erodes any value created through the transaction. 
This might be as a result of a Hubris effect, where over confident management believe 
that they know better than the market in terms of the pricing of targets; (Roll,  1986) 
 
2. Identifying inappropriate target companies based on flawed value creation logic. This 
refers to scenarios where synergistic benefits are not realised because the target 
company never possessed the potential for synergy. This would include BEE deals 
where the benefits of BEE would be unattainable; 
 
3. Leadership crisis when there is a struggle for power between the management of the 
acquiring company and the target; 
 
4. In M&A transactions there is often the merging of multiple differing cultures. The 
inability to manage these organisational differences results in a lack of integration and 
efficiency; 
 
5. The inability to integrate information technology systems and processes within the 
merged firms. The stand-alone firms might well have efficient systems and processes, 
however the systems may be very different and as such require a large investment and 
time to integrate; 
 
6. Poor financial planning and due diligence might result in the valuation of the target 
being based on incorrect numbers; 
 
7. Acquisition strategies are often not appropriate and as such impact the execution of 
the deal. Poorly executed deals increase the likelihood of failure; and 
 
8. The economic climate is a key driver of M&A success. Boom period promote deal 
success whereas recessionary periods increase the chances of deal failure. Large deals 














conceptualisation and consummation and as such markets can change within the 
interim. Thus probability of deal success is increased if timed correctly.    
 
Given the above mentioned causes of failure, what then drives success? 
 
Firstly, the financial planning and due diligence numbers need to be correct. If these numbers 
are not correct, incorrect investment decisions might be made. Secondly, when the acquiring 
company has satisfied itself as to the desirability of the investment opportunity it is vital that 
the deal is aligned with their acquisition strategy.  Thirdly, consideration must be given to 
how the integration of the two businesses will happen.  
 
To ensure successful integration, the following must be addressed: 
 
1. The acquirer needs to gain control over the performance and cash management of the 
target. Operating policies and reporting requirements need to become more stringent 
in terms of the timing and content. This is particularly important when the target’s 
management has been identified as being weak; 
 
2. The acquirer needs to ensure a fast and effective integration of systems and processes. 
The managerial processes need to be brought in line with those of the acquiring 
company. These would include; business planning, budgeting, capital expenditure and 
human resource management. The acquirer would effectively need to remove some 
level of autonomy until they were satisfied that their systems and processes were 
100% compatible; 
 
3. Leadership change must be fast and efficient and as such avoiding any clashes for 
power. If this is done properly with the right people in the right places, then 
integration and business risks will be reduced; and 
 
4. The core reasons for the acquisition must be clearly understood and must facilitate 
and drive the transaction and thinking throughout the process. The most important 
reason for an acquisition is the creation of value. This value need not necessarily be 
financial, but whatever was the reason, it must remain fundamental to the whole deal. 














1.4 Setting the scene: Ownership restructuring since 1895 
 
The concept of merging two firms has been around almost since the start of formalised 
business. It all started with the Great Merger movement, which took place from 1895 to 1905 
in the United States of America (US), where small companies producing homogeneous 
products looked to create bigger, more efficient production lines. Since then, the global 
economy has seen a number of M&A waves. Although these waves have occurred throughout 
the 20
th 
century, they are individually very different and differ between various industries and 
characterised by unique drivers and changes to their business operating environments. These 
primary catalysts for change seen in the 20
th
 century include; globalization, advancements in 
information technology, supply and/or demand changes, deregulation and the change in 
world power and subsequent political relationships. 
 
The M&A waves that occurred during the early parts of the 20
th
 century were typically either 
horizontal (buying similar) or vertical mergers (buying into the supply chain). The first wave 
took place between 1895 and 1905 and focussed on horizontal transactions.  
 
The latter period was dominated by the two World Wars and the absolute necessity to achieve 
the sufficient supply of armaments. The companies who supplied the war effort were 
typically heavy manufacturing businesses that enjoyed monopolistic powers in their 
respective industries. The majority of these companies failed when peace resumed as a result 
of falling demand.  
 
The economic boom that followed the end of World War 1 was the primary driver for the 
second wave which took place between 1916 and 1929. The majority of these mergers were 
vertical and were oligopolistic in nature as anti-trust laws of this era restricted monopolistic 
transactions as such efficiencies within the production process were sought. The stock market 
crash in 1929 saw the end of the second wave. 
 
The Great Depression and the start of World War 2 subdued M&A activity, until the third 
wave peaked between 1964 and 1969. This period of M&A activity was dominated by 
conglomerate mergers, where managers sought economies of scale through diversified 














characterized by companies acquiring targets far bigger than themselves. This was a period 
where there were a significant number of transactions relative to the number of publicly 
available targets, far more than the number of deals concluded in the 1980’s. ('Andrade, 
'Mitchell & 'Stafford, 2001) 
 
The fourth wave was characterized by the acquisition of large targets, with nearly 15% of all 
transactions being in the form of hostile takeovers. Thus, in value terms this decade was far 
more significant than the 1960’s, as the value per transaction was far higher. It signified an 
era of massive asset relocation which ended in 1990 with the onset of the Gulf War and the 
collapse of the US junk bond market. ('Andrade, 'Mitchell & 'Stafford, 2001) 
 
Fuelled by globalization and the deregulation of markets, the fifth M&A wave, consisting 
mainly of cross-border activities, took place between 1992 and 2000. This was a period of 
increased M&A activity which is significant as the number of deals was equivalent to that 
experienced in the 1960’s with transactional values matching those of the 1980’s. ('Andrade, 
'Mitchell & 'Stafford, 2001) The 2000 collapse of the information technology (IT) bubble and 
crash of global stock market ended the 1990’s M&A boom. 
 
It took the crash of 2000 nearly two years to show any form of recovery, but from 2003 to 
2007, global M&A has been rampant. The sixth wave covers the majority of the period 
covered by this study. The principle drivers of this wave were; globalization, the rise in 
commodity and share prices, availability of cheap financing and shareholder activism - all of 
which led to a significant growth in private equity funds and an increased number of varying 
management buyouts. In 2007, global M&A reached an all-time high of USD4 trillion with 
SA M&A reaching USD72.8 billion (R514 billion) and SA BEE M&A reaching USD13.6 
billion (R96 billion). (Ernst & Young, 2009) Throughout this time market capitalisation of 
stock markets world-wide were peaking and company executives in SA were able to sell non-
core companies within their groups at attractive prices. This was especially the case for BEE 
consortia which had easily accessible funding. The banking crisis was one of the primary 
reasons for the collapse of the world economy in 2008. The limited supply of financing 

















1.6 The Concept of Black Economic Empowerment 
 
Apartheid was a system that looked to suppress the rights of non-white South Africans by 
promoting and securing the rights of the minority. The regime was officially imposed by the 
National Party (NP), between 1948 and 1994, in a system that was designed to enforce mass 
racial segregation.  The concept of racial segregation was not new as in Africa it originated in 
the colonial era. 
 
After the 1994 democratic elections, the Government’s mandate was to redress the economic 
and social inequalities created by the Apartheid regime. In order to expedite this 
transformation process and to redress past disparities, new legislation was introduced. These 
laws aimed to make the private sector, which was primarily controlled by the white minority, 
more representative of the country’s demographics. 
 
Government (1994) drafted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
furnished parliament with the “White Paper”. The White Paper had the following six core 
principles: 
 
1. Integration and sustainability: The RDP was to be an integrated and sustainable 
mechanism in order to overcome the effects of Apartheid; 
 
2. People Driven: The RDP was not about the delivery of goods to citizens, but to get the 
citizens actively involved in the process of transformation and for them to become 
more self-sufficient;  
 
3. Peace and security: The roll out of the RDP was to be peaceful; 
 
4. Nation building: The emphasis being on one nation, contrary to the Apartheid ideals 
of multiple nations. This was evident in Nelson Mandela’s approach to the 1995 















5. Meeting basic needs and building the infrastructure: the RDP highlighted an 
infrastructural programme designed to bring modern and effective services such as, 
water and electricity etc. to areas without basic services; and 
 
6. Democratisation: That the people affected must participate in decision making. 
 
The RDP provided the overall blue print and guidance for the implementation of the 
country’s BEE policies. By the late 1990’s the impact of BEE had been limited and was well 
below original expectations. To promote and enhance BEE’s implementation, the Black 
Economic Commission was formed in 1998. The Commission’s directive was to formalise 
the BEE process and to establish benchmarks that would become business practice. In 2001, 
the BEE Commission Report was completed and set out the visions and strategies for the 
BEE policies. 
 
By the end of 2003, there was still no formal framework in place for business to measure 
broad-based BEE. In 2004 the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2004) 
(BBBEE Act) was promulgated and used as a mechanism to promote the Codes of Good 
Practice (CGP) as set out by the various industry Charters.  
 
“The intention of the Codes of Good Practice is therefore to level the playing field for all 
entities operating within the South African economy by providing clear and comprehensive 
criteria for the measurement of broad-based BEE.” (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007) 
 
Section 10 of the BBBEE Act (2004) requires that government and public companies must 
apply the CGP when dealing with the following: 
1. Issuing of licenses, concessions or authorisations; 
2. Procurements; 
3. Establishing qualification criteria for the sale of state-owned enterprises; and 
4. Establishing criteria for the entering into partnerships with the private sector. 
 
Thus the private sector would need to comply with the CGP in order to transact with 
government or public entities in order to tender for business, apply for licenses or 














throughout the chain of supply based on their compliance levels and percentage allowances 
for procurement. 
 
In order to measure compliance with the CGP, Section 8 of the BBBEE Act defines the 
generic scorecard. The Scorecard was created to measure compliance based on six different 
elements. They were initially proposed in 2003, but were later revised in 2007.  
Element 2003 Weighting 2007 Weighting 
Ownership 20% 20% 
Management Control 10% 10% 
Employment Equity 10% 15% 
Skills Development 20% 15% 
Preferential Procurement 20% 20% 
Enterprise Development 10% 15% 
Socio-Economic Initiatives 10% 5% 
 
Based on the overall score of a business, as measured by the scorecard above, businesses are 
categorised in terms of their BEE compliance. The higher the points achieved or the lower the 
level obtained, the higher the BBBEE recognition level. 
 
BBBEE Status Qualification (Scorecard) BBBEE Recognition Level 
Level one >=100 points 135% 
Level two >= 85 points <= 100 125% 
Level three >= 75 points <= 85 110% 
Level four >= 65 points <= 75 100% 
Level five >= 55 points <= 65 80% 
Level six >= 45 points <= 55 60% 
Level seven >= 40 points <= 45 50% 
Level eight >= 30 points <= 40 10% 
















1.7 Black Economic Empowerment’s Impact on Business 
 
The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those that have 
much; it is whether we provide enough for those that have too little” Franklin D Roosevelt - 
2
nd
 Presidential Address January 20, 1937 (2009). 
 
In 1994, democracy demanded change in order to establish a viable means of redressing the 
inequalities created by the Apartheid regime. Knowing that the majority of the post-
Apartheid economy was owned and controlled by the white minority, it was the white 
minority who were to face the biggest change. This invoked a widespread fear within the 
business community. In 1994 the RDP set out the blue print strategies for these policy 
changes but nothing followed that established practical guidelines for business. Although the 
Employment Equity Act and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Acts were introduced in 
1998 and 2000 respectively, they had little practical effect. It was only in 2001 that the BEE 
Commission formalised this and paved the way for the BBBEE Act of 2003. The result was 
that during the 7 years, between 1994 and 2001, business was unclear as to the practical 
business implications of BEE. This vagueness fuelled business’s fear and negative sentiment 
of BEE. 
 
As was to be expected, the introduction of the RDP brought about a significant amount of 
criticism. Critics argued that the implementation of BEE followed a very similar philosophy 
to that of Apartheid, where economic discrimination was based on race, culture and 
upbringing and as such would fuel the “brain drain”. Thus, the affirmative action program 
was seen as an extension of Apartheid and as such would have a negative impact on foreign 
direct investment (FDI). They further argued that over and above the high implementation 
costs, BEE would be ineffectual in redistributing wealth and would serve to benefit the 
politically connected elite.  
 
“What is black empowerment when it seems to benefit not the vast majority but an elite that 
tends to be recycled.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu -BBC News (Tuesday, 23 November, 2004, 















Empowerdex, South Africa’s leading BEE Rating and Advisory Company negated a number 
of the criticisms highlighted above, in two different surveys. The intention of the first study 
was to change the perception - that BEE had a negative impact on FDI. Qualitatively, the 
analysis clearly shows that FDI is strongly correlated to business and economic confidence 
and as such the usual mechanisms of attracting FDI, such as tax incentives and import duty 
exemptions etc., are largely ineffectual. McKinsey Global Institute reports that the primary 
drivers of FDI are strength of economic foundations, stability and the creation of strong 
brands. Thus a policy such as BEE would attract FDI rather than repel it. Quantitatively, the 
South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) reports that Business Confidence Index (BCI) 
has been increasing, from a low in September 1998 to the highs experienced in September 
2004 and this positive influence can be seen in the growth in annual FDI since 
2001.(Empowerdex, June 2005) 
 
The second study looked to dispel the perception that the costs of BEE were excessive and 
unwarranted. Although simply put, the study qualitatively shows that the firms with higher 
BEE scores tend to perform better, in terms of profit margins, than firms with lower scores. 
This would not be the case if the costs of implementing BEE were excessive and 
unwarranted. (Empowerdex, September 2006) 
 
Hoffman (2008) argues that although BEE is inevitable if SA is to redress the past 
inequalities, the fundamental flaws of BEE need to be addressed. Hoffman highlights a 
number of policy flaws.  
 
Firstly, Apartheid’s structural plan was to empower the Afrikaans nation and in doing so 
alleviate white poverty and strengthen support for the ruling party. Given that the 
beneficiaries of BEE have been the black elite few, there are no major differences between 
the principles of Apartheid and BEE. 
 
Secondly, the focus of BBBEE was on ownership and management and as such was 
problematic in that it created an artificial demand to fill quotas with inadequate skills. Given 
that Apartheid limited the education and skill sets available to non-whites, there was an 
obvious shortage of adequate skill to fill the quotas. Thus it was a trend of business to fill the 
necessary quotas for compliance purposes, but for representation purposes only and thus 















Thirdly, for BBBEE to be wider spread there needs to be mandatory compliance within the 
private sector. Currently the BBBEE Act relates to organs of state and public entities and as 
such the private sector is indirectly impacted. Thus the impact of BEE would be far wider 
spread if the private sector was included within the ambit of the Act. 
 
Lastly, BBBEE has been ineffectual in benefiting the majority of the population, and 
currently there is only a small group of politically connected elites that are benefiting. BEE in 
its initial form had no broad based impact and as such there was no creation a new black 
middle class. The term “Black Diamonds” refers to the new emerging black middle class. 
 
Hoffman (2008) concludes that the current BBBEE policy is not sustainable over the long 
term unless there is adequate reformation and reconstruction of the policies themselves and 
offers the following reforms. 
 
Firstly, South Africa’s policies need to be broadened on all business levels so that the focus is 
not only on black ownership and management. The vast majority of the population does not 
have the necessary skill to obtain the opportunities created through BBBEE nor do they have 
the capital to acquire ownership (via shares etc.). To alleviate this, South Africa should 
promote an environment that supports entrepreneurship by making funding more attainable.  
 
Secondly, legislation should be changed to exclude race from being the controlling factor in 
BBBEE. Alternative methods available exist, that would produce similar sustainable results. 
For example given that the majority of non-whites were restricted in terms of the education 
possibilities, government should improve education on a broad level to ensure that more 
people are educated and as such enable more people access to jobs that they would previously 
















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 General 
 
2.1.1 BEE in the Market Place 
 
In 2010, global M&A reached USD2.4 trillion, being the strongest period since the start of 
the recession. This resilience and subsequent growth was driven by the growth in emerging 
markets M&A which contributed 33% of global M&A (USD806.3 billion), being up 76.2% 
from 2009. (Thompson Reuters) 
 
 
Figure 1- (Ernst & Young, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2009) 
The contribution of emerging markets to Global M&A has been significant and thus the 
impact it is having on the emerging economies demands greater evaluation and 
understanding. In South Africa in 2009, total M&A reached R181.63 billion with BEE 
transactions contributing 20% at R36.5 billion. Throughout the period of review, 1998 to 
2008, BEE has seen both the up and downside of the local economy and yet it remained 
resilient, contributing on average 20% of all South African M&A activity. The primary driver 
of this resilience was the political pressure that was placed on business - via the Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE Act) and the various BEE charters. The impact 
of these charters is clearly seen in figure 3, where there is a significant increase in BEE. 
(Ernst & Young, 2009) Figure 2 shows that the biggest contributors to global M&A in 2007 
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Africa and the Middle East contributed 3% to global M&A with South Africa contributing on 
average 62% of all M&A activity in Africa and the Middle East.    
 
 
Figure 2 – Global contribution to M&A activity (Thompson Reuters, 2009) 
 
2.1.2 Quantifying the Impact: 
 
Ponte, Roberts & van Sittert (2007) in their study outlining the history and development of 
BEE, show that BEE policies in the late 1990’s had a negative effect on black ownership. 
They show that black ownership on the JSE fell from 9.6% in 1998 to 3.5% in 2002. The 
primary reason for this was the inadequate financing structures used. In the 1990’s, the 
majority of the deals were financed through special purpose vehicles. Due to the fact that 
black business had limited capital, deals were highly leveraged against the underlying shares. 
Stock market performance was sluggish and due to the pressure on emerging markets resulted 
in many of the transactions defaulting. Throughout this cycle interests rates increased, share 
prices dropped and dividends decreased thus reducing the amount of income available to 
service the debt. However, although not in line with original quotas, black ownership on the 
JSE has increased quite significantly. 
 
In 2006, Empowerdex released a report that tracked the progress of the implementation of 
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throughout all of the various sectors, was 49.34% which resulted in an average level 6 
contribution being achieved which results in a BEE procurement recognition level of 60%. 98 
companies out of a total of 228 listed companies achieved a BEE score of 50 points or more. 
('Wu, 'Serrao & 'Matja, June 2006) 
 
The following table reviews the top 100 BEE compliant companies listed on the JSE, the vast 












(2 - 1) 
Ownership 20% 7.99% 20% 16.98% 8.99% 
Management Control 10% 3.89% 10% 5.75% 1.86% 
Employment Equity 10% 3.94% 15% 7.38% 3.44% 
Skills Development 20% 9.76% 15% 8.55% -1.21% 
Preferential Procurement 20% 5.93% 20% 16.38% 10.45% 
Enterprise Development 10% 3.75% 15% 13.53% 9.78% 
Social Economic Development 10% 7.90% 5% 4.71% -3.19% 
Total / Average 100% 43.17% 100% 73.27% 30.10% 
Source: Data adapted from Tholiwe Ngidi, Empowerdex (BEE Scores of JSE Top 100 BEE Companies 
2006/2011)  
 
As seen from the table above, the average BEE compliance in 2006 was 43.17% with skills 
development (SD) and ownership being the biggest contributors. 47% of the companies 
achieved a score in excess of the average, with the average score equating to a level seven 
compliance and the best score achieving level three compliance. The emphasis on skills 
development would tend to negate Hoffman’s (2008) criticism, as this spend would suggest 
that companies are looking to improve education standards and skill levels within company 
structures. The underachievement of preferential procurement supports Hoffman’s (2008) 
claim that there needs to be mandatory compliance within the private sector. However given 
the fact that ownership, management and employment equity targets have not been met 
suggests that real transformation objectives have not materialised. This is further supported 














met the employment equity requirements and only 2% of the companies met the management 
requirements per the generic scorecard.  
 
It is evident from the above 2006 results that companies prefer the easier spend without 
giving away ownership or management control. Any expenditure in terms of skills 
development or socio-economic development (SED) would entitle the company to rebates 
such as tax and SETA rebates. Thus companies want to be perceived as being highly BEE 
compliant and to the general public spend in terms of SED or SD would achieve this. Thus 
companies get the image of being BEE compliant without the loss of ownership or control. 
However this is to be expected given the enormity of change required by Government – it is 
inevitable that companies would be hesitant.  
 
In 2011, the average BEE score of the top 100 Companies listed on the JSE was 73.27% with 
the biggest contributors, in terms of actual points, being ownership and preferential 
procurement. 53% of these companies achieved a score in excess of this average, with the 
average score equating to a level four compliance and with the best score achieving a level 
two compliance. Preferential procurement has increased significantly by 10.45%. This 
indicates that companies are being selective - only dealing with suppliers and customers who 
are more BEE compliant. This would suggest that throughout the supply chain businesses are 
looking to take advantage of percentages claimable as a result of the preferential 
procurement. Enterprise development and ownership increased significantly by 9.78% and 
8.99% respectively.  This clearly illustrates the point that public perception is of the utmost 
importance for companies. This is further supported by the fact that companies spend 
excessive amounts of money in order to support BBBEE initiatives, which at a maximum 
would result in a 20% contribution to their scorecard. Public perception and a moral duty to 
try and rectify past injustices is the primary reason for this. However of the top 100 
companies, no companies met the employment equity targets and only 4% of the companies 
met the management targets. This highlights the point that real transformation in the 
workplace has not been achieved.  
 
The increase in ownership from 2006 to 2011 appears to be in line with JSE findings. The 
JSE, in September 2010, pegged black ownership at 18% of the JSE. Further to their findings, 
the JSE shows that if foreign investors are excluded from their analysis then actual relative 














ownership of the JSE, black and white ownership of the JSE needs to be calculated and 
tracked on a net basis, excluding foreign investment. This will show the true transfer of 
ownership from the white minority to the black majority. This suggests that black ownership 
of the JSE has increased at a rate more than the public is aware of. 
 
Behavioural finance suggests that movements in the markets are created by changing investor 
perceptions. It is important to understand what the announcement of an imminent BEE 
transaction signals to the stakeholders and external public as this sentiment will be reflected 
in the underlying share price on announcement date. Allessandri, Black & Jackson (2009) 
conclude that a company’s BEE strategy forms part of its Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) – i.e. serve to accomplish social benefits whilst offering potential economic benefits. 
Each firm’s CSR strategy being different based on their stakeholder priorities. Their results 
show that stakeholders view BEE deals as a positive CSR and as such this is seen by their 
achieving positive abnormal returns around the announcement date of such transactions. 
 
Whilst there are definitely areas of concern within BEE policy that need to be addressed, 
there can be no doubt that BEE, in its short life, is starting to gain momentum. As such the 
understanding, perception and appreciation of these policies is growing. Thus the need to 














2.1.3 The Market’s Reaction to Ownership Announcements 
 
An efficient market is one in which the market price of a share reflects the unbiased estimate 
of the true economic value of the share.('Damodaran, 1996b) Thus if new information is 
publicised about a company, that news will be incorporated into the share price quickly and 
rationally with respect to both the direction and size of the change. There have been a number 
of studies performed on the JSE with no clear indication as to how efficient the market really 
is. Jefferis and Smith (2005) found the JSE to be weak form efficient throughout the period 
1990 to 2001. Weak form efficiency suggests that share prices fully reflect all historical 
information contained in past price movements. ('Arnold, 2005c) 
 
In its simplest form, the value of a share is the present value of the share’s future cash flows – 
being the future dividends and eventual selling price. For the Dividend Discount Model, there 
are two basic inputs: the expected dividends and the required rate of return. To determine the 
future dividend amounts, assumptions have to be made around earnings, growth and dividend 
policy. The required rate of returns is driven by the riskiness of the share and this is measured 
differently depending on which model is used. ('Damodaran, 1996a) 
 
Knowing that the value of a share is determined by the future cash flows and the relative risk 
of the underlying business, any information that might potentially impact cash flows and/or a 
company’s risk profile will have a direct impact on the current pricing of a share. This change 
to the share price reflects the investor’s reaction or sentiment to the new information. Event 
studies use time series analysis to measure the impact of an event on the value of a company. 
Share price changes at or around the announcement date reflect the market’s sentiment either 
positively or negatively.  
 
This study looks to evaluate whether or not BBBEE ownership announcements create or 
destroy value for the acquiring firm. Positive short term price reactions, around the 
announcement date, would reflect positive investor sentiment arising from the increased level 
BEE compliance. The share price movements will be evaluated over the longer-term, 
allowing us to determine whether or not any value created is sustained. The biggest limitation 
facing long term is studies are the impact of confounding events. In order to reduce this risk, 
companies involved in multiple deals will be eliminated from the sample. Short term studies 














announcement. The speed at which this change occurs differs from market to market, and is 
determined by how efficient the market is thought to be. The faster a market reacts to 















2.2 Academic Studies 
 
2.2.1 Overview of Literature 
 
South African literature is limited in terms of the number of research studies performed on 
BEE transactions. This is primarily due to the fact that BEE is a new phenomenon and as a 
result a number of the studies suffer from small sample sizes. Jefferis & Smith (2005) in their 
analysis of African stock markets, show that the JSE is weak form efficient and that this 
characteristic is common for many of the larger stock exchanges – such as the London Stock 
Exchange.  
 
Typically ownership transactions form part of a company’s financing strategy. However BEE 
ownership transactions can be considered a hybrid strategy in that they form both a financing 
and investment strategy. The structures of most BEE ownership transactions are similar to 
traditional forms of finance, such as share offers. However there is definitely an investment 
element to the decision. BEE transactions are more costly than traditional financing and are 
entered into not only to improve public image, but also as a result of the increased business 
opportunities. Thus there is a definite decision to take the more expensive financing option to 
gain access to a greater business market.  Thus BEE transactions form part of a company’s 
investment strategy and are not inherently different to any other investment decision. 
Companies are motivated to engage in acquisitions for many different reasons with the 
ultimate goal of maximising company profits. BEE compliance is a business imperative to 
achieve greater to exposure to the market. Thus, in theory, the investment in BEE now will 
create greater shareholder value by companies taking advantage of increased opportunities.  
 
This study looks to evaluate the share price reaction to BEE announcements around the 
announcement date and the following 3 years. The short term reaction will indicate whether 
investor sentiment regarding the deal is positive whereas the longer term reaction will 
















Due to the fact that this study evaluates the impact of BEE announcements over the short and 
the longer term, it is important to gain an understanding of the literature so as to gain support 
statistical findings.  
 
2.2.2 Overview of Ownership Transactions – M&A Studies 
 
M&A, as an investment strategy, provides management with a fast and effective means to 
grow business operations. The neo-classical theory suggests that management make decisions 
that maximise shareholder value. In order to maximise shareholder value, on a timely basis, 
M&A has been used as a tool to generate additional profits. BEE M&A has been used for 
exactly the same purpose in that the improved public image and improved BEE compliance 
ratings will result in greater business opportunities. 
 
Given that the majority of M&A transactions do not meet original expectations, why then has 
M&A growth been so dramatic? Given the significant impact of M&A on business, there 
have been a vast number of studies that have looked to analyse the impact of such 
transactions. The majority of studies have looked to evaluate the impact of M&A through 
financial (accounting) and economic (efficient markets) means. Given the accounting 
restrictions imposed on valuations, this study looks to review the economic impact of M&A 
announcements through changes in share prices.   
 
Existing evidence in both the US and the United Kingdom (UK) suggests that M&A creates 
value for shareholders where the target company’s gain and the acquiring companies do not 
lose or show small positive returns. These returns tend to peak around the announcement date 
where thereafter these returns tend to erode and shift downwards. This is because synergistic 
benefits are not realised over the long term and as such cannot retrospective justify the 
premiums paid. Thus negative post acquisition price changes are a mechanism used by the 




















Target Company Returns: 
 
There are a number of studies that find significant positive returns for target company 
shareholders. The premiums paid to target company shareholders drive these gains.  
Mandelker (1974), shows that the shareholders of the target companies earn positive 
abnormal returns of approximately 14% for the period leading up to an including the merger 
date. The results of Langetieg (1978) were in line with that of Mandelker (1974) which 
showed that the target companies earned positive abnormal returns for the period up to and 
including the announcement date of 12.92%. Dodd & Ruback (1977) and Dodd (1980) show 
that regardless of whether a bid is accepted or rejected, the target company shareholders still 
earn positive abnormal returns. 
 
These results have also been corroborated by more recent studies of Franks & Harris (1989) 
and Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001) which show that target shareholders earn positive 
abnormal returns of 23% and 15.98% around the announcement date respectively. This would 
appear to be the case for BEE participants regardless of whether the transaction involved an 
acquisition or disposal of shares. Acquisitions made at premium prices or disposals at 
discounts would both result in that benefit passing on to the “target” BEE beneficiary. 
 
Combined Company Returns: 
 
The ability of the combined firm to create value hinges on the premium paid for the 
acquisition of the target. The combined company will create value provided that the premium 
paid by the acquiring company is not in excess of the synergistical returns created from the 
acquisition. Thus if the acquiring company does not lose from the deal, then the net result is 
an increase in value and thus supports the notion that M&A’s are a value adding growth 
strategy. Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001) evaluated a sample of 3 688 mergers through 
the period 1973 to 1998. Their study evaluated the short term abnormal returns around the 
announcement dates over the periods -1 day to +1 day post announcement and -20 to 
announcement date. Their results show that the combined companies produce abnormal 
positive un-weighted average returns of 1.83% and 1.70% through the period 1973 to 1998. 
















Acquiring Company Abnormal Returns: 
 
There are contrasting results for the abnormal returns of the acquiring companies. Some of 
the earlier studies show tendencies for positive abnormal returns. Asquith, Bruner & Mullins   
(1983) show that acquiring companies earn positive abnormal average returns of 2.8% around 
the merger announcement date. These returns are even greater when controlled for target size 
and outcome of the merger bid. Schipper & Thompson (1983), show that regardless of 
whether an acquisition forms part of a new investment or acquisition program, the acquiring 
company shareholders earn positive abnormal returns of 13% for the period -12 months to 
announcement dates. Dodd (1980) shows that regardless of whether a bid is rejected or 
accepted, the acquiring company shareholders earn negative abnormal returns of between -
5.50% and -7.2% during the announcement period. Barnes (1984) shows that although the 
acquiring company might earn small abnormal returns around the announcement date, these 
returns were on average eroded downwards by 6.3% over the five year period post 
acquisition. This study showed that 56% of the population re-valued their announcement 
share price downwards. The prominent reason for the negative returns, is the hefty premiums 
that acquirers are forced to pay. The excessive premiums paid counter any synergistically 
value created. Barber & Lyon (1997) also suggests that the contrasting results may be due the 
considerable variations used in measuring long run returns. 
 
Given the contrasting results and now understanding what the above deal characteristics have 
on the transactions, a review of the comprehensive studies needs to be performed. 
 
Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992) US study examines the long term impact of M&A 
transactions on the acquiring company through the period 1955 to 1987. Their study uses 
standard event study methodology and controls for company size and beta risk. Their results 
show, that regardless of whether an equal or value weighted index is used, the post 
acquisitions CAAR’s are -7.5% and -10.26% through 5 years respectively. Limmack (1991) 
shows in his study of UK transactions through the period 1977 to 1986, that acquiring 
company shareholders do lose value over a 2 year period post acquisition. Announcement 
period CAR’s of -0.20% shift downwards to between -6.87% and -14.08% depending on the 
benchmark over the 2 year period. Gregory (1997) shows that regardless of benchmarks used, 
the post-acquisition performance of acquirers is negative at -11.17% for 2 years post 














produce better 2 year results at -5.18%. Mitchell & Stafford (2000) provide estimates of long 
term abnormal returns in their review 2068 transactions during the period 1961 to 1993. Their 
study uses both equal and value weighted benchmarks controlling for medium of exchange 
and classification of growth versus glamour. Their results show that for the full sample, 
regardless of benchmark, 3 year post acquisition returns are negative. When controlled for the 
medium of exchange, cash transactions produced more positive results that equity based 
transactions. Value companies also produce better results than those of glamour companies. 
Their results show that only equal weighted portfolios produce significant abnormal returns 




In conclusion, it is evident that M&A do create or at least not destroy shareholder value. This 
is because target companies make significant positive returns, whereas acquiring companies 
might not make positive returns, but their negative returns are often more than offset by the 
gains made by the target. Acquirer’s tend to make positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement, but these returns are quickly eroded post acquisition. 
 
2.2.3 Further considerations 
 
It is also evident that as the study of M&A has progressed and become more comprehensive - 
methodologies and trends have advanced in order to reduce the number of variables. The 
characteristics of each M&A transaction need to be reviewed in isolation in order to 
determine its impact on the share returns. In reviewing multiple studies it is evident that the 
most noticeable characteristics are the following and their impact on returns need careful 
understood because BEE transactions structured and executed in similar ways would be 
subject to similar return reactions.   
 
Means of payment 
 
There are a number of studies that have clearly shown that the means of payment has a 
significant influence on the outcome in M&A transactions. Typically transactions are either 
considered to be mergers or tender offers. Mergers, usually in the form of stock, are often 














management. Tender offers, usually in the form of cash, are considered “hostile” as the 
acquiring company usually makes bids directly to the target company shareholders. Loughran 
& Vijh (1997) in their study show that acquirers in merger deals on average earn 15.9% less 
than matched firms whereas acquirers in tender offers earn 43% more than matched firms 
over a 5 year period. Rau & Vermaelen (1996) study corroborates these findings as they show 
that acquirers in mergers on average under-perform the market by 4% whereas acquirers in 
tender offers outperform the market by 9% over a period of 3 years.  
 
A number of reasons might exist for the varying results based between mergers or tender 
offers. Deals via tender offers are on average faster to conclude that mergers. Given that 
transaction speed is key to deal success, tender offers produce better results. The hostility of 
the transaction ensures that ineffective management are replaced and as such there is no 
vagueness as to the corporate hierarchy which allows for a more effective management. 
These findings would impact BEE acquisitions where acquiring companies buy equity in 
BEE companies. The results indicate that acquirers should utilise cash resources as the 
primary source of funding when entering such transactions. 
 
Medium of exchange  
 
The medium of exchange used to effect transactions has a significant impact on the share 
price movement and as such on the returns achieved. This is because the financing decision 
(cash versus equity) carries important information to investors. The decision has both positive 
and negative bearings for both sets of shareholders. If cash is used, the acquiring company 
shareholders benefit as they do not lose control over their company by issuing stock. Cash 
transactions are far faster, and as such better the chances of success. For the target company 
shareholders cash received has a definite value but because the gain will be realised there will 
be resulting capital gains tax implications. This would again indicate that BEE acquisitions 
should be utilised out of cash reserves as the BEE benefit will be obtained without any loss of 
ownership or control. 
 
Arnold (2005b) Management’s internal valuation of their stock also has a bearing on this 
decision. If management consider their stock to be undervalued by the market, management 
would prefer a cash deal as the relative cost is lower. Barnes (1984) shows that the CAR’s for 














announcement month, cash transactions had a cumulative average abnormal return of 1.6% as 
opposed to the -2.6% earned via equity transactions. Loughran & Vijh (1997) show in their 
study that cash acquirers earn 18.5% more than the matched companies, whereas equity 
acquirers earn 24.2% less than matched firms. Thus, given these results, it appears that 
investors recognise equity transactions as a signal of the acquiring company’s shares being 
overvalued and hence the downward adjustment of the share price to compensate for this.  
 
The use of cash or equity as the medium of exchange has also varied throughout various 
decades. Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001) in their analysis show that transactions in the 
1990’s were characterized by the overwhelming use of stock as the medium of exchange with 
70.9% of all transactions involving some form of stock (57.8% of transactions entirely stock 
based). This is considerably more than the 1970’s and 1980’s where stock transactions were 
45.1% (all stock 37%) and 45.6% (all stock 32.9%) respectively.  
 
Chatterjee & Kuenzi (2001) evaluated the influence that the medium of exchange had on the 
acquiring company share price for transactions throughout the 1990’s. Their results indicate 
that there has been a shift in the information content associated with regards to the medium of 
exchange. Their results show that stock based transactions no longer lead to negative 
abnormal returns, but in fact result in positive abnormal returns. They conclude that this shift 
in the investor’s assessment of the information content of medium of exchange is as a result 
of changing sensitivity to levels of risk, as stock transactions are being used to finance the 
riskier more audacious deals. Given the inherent riskiness of BEE deals, this shift in the 
information content of medium of exchange might see investors preferring BEE deals 
financed by their own stock. 
 
Glamour/Neutral/Value Firms  
 
Behavioural finance supports the fact that investor behaviour drives changes in the market. 
The information content of decisions made by management sway investor perception and 
sentiment. Various studies have shown that controlling for whether the acquirer is considered 
“glamour” or “value” company has a significant impact on the potential returns from deals. 
Companies are considered to be “value” companies if they have a high book to market ratio 
and a low book to market ratio for “glamour” companies. Management of glamour firms 














stock as the medium of exchange. The greater the discrepancy in the valuation, the greater the 
premium the acquirer would-be willing to pay. The opposite is the case for “value” 
companies. Thus management of “glamour” companies are more likely to overestimate their 
abilities and less likely to have stringent deal or no deal price parameters resulting in a greater 
probability of unsuccessful M&A deals. Rau & Vermaelen (1996) in their study show that 
“glamour” companies, regardless of whether considered a takeover or a merger, 
underperform the market over a three year period (takeovers -24.28% and mergers -56.77%). 
Whereas value firms outperform the market with CAR’s of 36.13% and 26.07% for takeovers 
and mergers respectively. Wimberley & Negash (2004)  corroborated these results from the 
South African perspective. 
 
Prior Control  
 
The fact that an acquirer had a prior interest in the target suggests that the acquirer is well 
entrenched into the business operations of the target and as such was well aware of its profit 
potential and risk profile. The risk of poor integration is negated, as any integration issues 
would have been worked through in the initial acquisition. Thus having prior control should 
have a positive bearing on any returns achieved in subsequent transactions.  
 
Van den Hoenert, Barr, Affleck-Graves & Smale (1988) in their study controls for whether 
there was prior shareholding; those transactions which had prior control greater than 50%, 
and those transactions where prior control was less than 50%. Although the announcement 
abnormal returns for the two control groups were similar, the post acquisitions share price 
movements differed quite considerably. In the group where prior control was greater than 
50%, post-acquisition abnormal returns declined at a slow rate and at 1 year post acquisition 
resulted in a net CAR of 2%. The abnormal returns of the second group were volatile and 
post-acquisition abnormal returns declined at a faster rate, resulting in a net CAR at 1 year 
post acquisition of approximately -10%. Although this study suffered from small sample size, 
the impact of prior control is clearly pointed out.  Franks & Harris (1989) corroborate the 
above findings, and show an increased level of value to the combined firm in transactions 
where the acquirer had a pre-deal interest in the target. 
 
Thus following this results, repeated BEE deals with the same partners should result in 














acquiring company was deriving benefit from that partner. Non-value adding partners would 
not be reused. This however would come at the expense of deals not being considered broad-
based. 
 
Size mismatching  
 
Size-mismatching occurs when acquirers buy targets that are small relative to their size. If 
there is a high degree of mismatch, where the acquirer is far larger than the target, any 
intrinsic value from the acquisition is difficult to single out. Thus mismatch would definitely 
have an impact on BEE deals with larger BEE deals will having a far greater impact on share 
prices. Critics argue that management must be aware of acquiring targets that are too small 
because the relative opportunity costs of the transaction are far higher. Brews (1987), 
concludes that “organizations should be wary of acquiring other organizations very much 
smaller than themselves. The management time and effort required to negotiate and 
implement such a transaction, and indeed to correct matters should the deal go awry is 
usually exorbitant.” Thus given how costly BEE deals are, companies should identify larger 




Diversification should not drive M&A programs. This is because investors would be able to 
diversify their own portfolios by simply buying varying shares. Arnold (2005b;  2005c) It is 
believed that by entering unrelated industries, management are less likely to be successful 
over the long term especially as the learning curve is time consuming. Thus buying a 
company that is related and as such is similar to that of the target promotes a far higher 
probability of success for the merger. Brews (1987), through a series of questionnaires given 
to senior management and directors, concludes that the nature of business of the target 
company is the single most important factor contributing to the success of M&A. van den 
Hoenert, Barr, Affleck-Graves and Smale (1988) in their study compare related and unrelated 
transaction over a period of – 50 weeks to + 50 weeks post announcement. The results show 
that, although the share price movements had similar patterns, the results for the related 
transactions were more positive. At announcement date, both unrelated and related returns 
shift downward, to a point where related and unrelated transactions show abnormal returns of 














results definitely do support the fact that related transactions tend to have more favourable 














2.3 South African Studies 
 
Wimberley & Negash (2004) study is the most comprehensive SA study relating to M&A. 
Their study examines the long term price effects of M&A for firms listed on the JSE over the 
period 1989 to 1998.  Two methodologies were used in order to establish the long term 
impact of M&A announcements. The use of CAR and the calendar time abnormal returns 
(CTAR) determines if companies persistently earn abnormal returns when ignoring the 
months transaction cost of repurchasing (i.e. the inherent costs involved with the buying and 
selling of shares). The control portfolio method was used in order to establish the benchmark. 
The benchmark was calculated on the population, as defined below, net of eliminated firms. 
The benchmark firms were then grouped according to their size and book to price ratios.   
 
Due to the fact that M&A activity in the industrial sector accounted for 1/3 of all JSE activity 
and that this activity was comprised of a huge amount of transactions thus eliminating the 
risk of being distorted by a few transactions, the industrial sector was used to extract the 
sample. Not all of the M&A transactions were defined as events for the purposes of their 
study and as such defined events required the following: 
 
 The acquiring firms had to be listed in the industrial sector; 
 
 To avoid size mismatching, size criterion were used to rank the size of the 
acquisitions. Only significant transactions, where the consideration was at least 20% 
of the market capitalisation of the acquiring firm, were selected; 
 
 A 20% shareholding was used as a minimum cut-off. This is because M&A success is 
largely dependent on the acquirer’s ability to influence the business operations of the 
target; and 
 
 All unusual transactions or structures were eliminated from the sample – e.g. “N” 
shares or pyramid companies. 
 
The total number of M&A transactions during the period was 728 and after eliminating the 














classified accordingly based on the return to shareholders, market capitalisation and book to 
price value. 
 
The results of the research suggest that investors should not invest in M&A active firms over 
the long term. The CAR for the 36 months post acquisition result is -10.5% with the CTAR 
showing a more negative trend. The CAR analysis suggests that investors should sell out at 7 
months post-acquisition in order to maximise returns. When the sample was split into value, 
glamour or neutral firms, it was on the value firms that showed a positive CAR of 10.1% at 
month 36. Neutral firms showed the worst results with a CAR of -28.9% (Glamour CAR -
14.4%) at 36 months. This is in line with studies previously mentioned. 
 
Although the studies of Affleck-Graves, Flach & Jacobson (1988) and van den Hoenert, Barr, 
















2.4 BEE Studies 
 
Alessandri, Black & Jackson (2009) applied standard short-term event study methodology to 
determine whether or not BEE deals created value. Their sample included 64 BEE deals 
concluded between 1993 and 2005 which accounted for 8% of the number of transactions and 
48% of the value of transaction during that period. Their results show that of the 64 
transactions, 40 were made at a discount of on average 35% with the remaining 24 made at a 
premium of 58%. The calculation and determination of the premium or discount was based 
on the difference between the market price and deal price on the day of the announcement. 
The inherent deal data was obtained from BusinesMap, a strategic investment company 
whose focus is on BEE deals. Their results show that the transactions made at a discount 
earned shareholders a short term positive abnormal return of 3.2% around the announcement 
date. Transactions made at a premium resulted in a short term negative abnormal returns of 
approximately -1% around the announcement date. This study concluded that BEE 
transactions formed an integral part of Corporate Social Responsibility and genuine BEE 
deals offered at a discount were rewarded with positive returns. Although this study identified 
key variables, it suffered from a small sample size and poor methodology. The bench mark 
used was the market model and did not control for key factors such as size, sector or timing.  
 
The research completed by Ward & Muller (2010) examined the long term impact of BEE 
announcements on the share price of the acquiring company. The testing period for the study 
was 8 years and covered the period 2000 to 2008. Given that it is a JSE requirement for 
companies to make SENS announcements for any transactions that might impact its share 
price, the SENS database was used to extract the BEE transactions. An initial sample of 175 
firms had announced at least one BEE deal but the final sample only included 118 companies 
after eliminating transactions with confounding events, which are events that typically would 
impact share price movements. These would include for example trading results or unrelated 
corporate actions. A second control group was created for companies that engaged in multiple 
BEE transactions over the event period, of which there were 28. 
 
The methodology used to calculate the long term impact of the BEE transactions was CAR. 
















 Whether the company was in the resource or non-resource sector. All mining and non-
mining shares were classified as resource;  
 
 Classification as either a growth or value company ranked according to their price to 
earnings (PE) ratios. After ranking the companies, the median was calculated with all 
companies with PE ratios above the median being classified as growth; 
 
 Size of the companies was calculated using their market capitalisation and split into 3 
groups; large, medium and small capitalisation portfolios; 
 
 The transactions were grouped according to their timing - being early or late with the aim 
of identifying whether the pioneering BEE announcements were more or less successful 
in terms of returns; and 
 
 Companies making multiple BEE deals were controlled for, where the returns of the 
second transaction were compared to the initial transaction. 
 
Each acquiring company share was allocated into one of the 12 portfolios where each 
portfolio was rebalanced every quarter to ensure that any material changes to the share profile 
were closely tracked. To ensure the robustness of the results a single beta coefficient capital 
asset pricing model was estimated. The significance of the results was tested using both the t-
test and bootstrapping tests. 
 
The results show that for the full sample that positive abnormal returns are experienced from 
80 days post announcement and that the 250 day CAR is approximately 10%. When 
controlled for size, the smaller companies experienced stronger positive abnormal returns 
whereas the larger companies experienced marginally negative CAR’s. The CAR for smaller 
companies reached a maximum of approximately 20% at 180 days post announcement. This 
observation supports the size mismatching argument where large companies are already so 
entrenched in the market that the benefits of BEE are difficult in distinguish.  When 
controlled for timing, it was evident that the “late” transactions earned positive abnormal 














140 days post acquisition. However, irrespective of timing, both first and last movers earned 
positive abnormal returns of 8% and 12% over the 250 days post acquisition respectively. 
When controlled for multiple BEE deals, it was evident that the subsequent transactions were 
less attractive than the initial deals. 
 
Du Plooy (2009) investigated 13 companies involved in BEE transactions in 2005 to 
determine if abnormal returns were associated with the BEE announcements. The results of 
this paper show that positive CAR’s of 1.85% were observed around the announcement date. 
The average CAR’s were found to be statistically significant. Although this paper suggests 














Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1: Abnormal Returns 
 
Standard event study methodology will be used to measure the impact of the unanticipated 
event – being the announcement of the BEE deal. A market return will be calculated to 
establish a benchmark in order to establish abnormal returns. This standard event study 
methodology will allow the study to determine whether there has been an abnormal share 
price reaction associated with a particular BEE announcement. Abnormal returns will be used 
to determine the significance of the BEE announcement through the change in share price 
relative to the change in the market. Tests of significance will be performed in order to 
establish if abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. 
 
Event study methodology is based on three key assumptions ('McWilliams & 'Siegel, 1997). 
Any violation of these assumptions might result in the conclusions being incorrectly drawn 
from the results. 
 
Firstly, markets are assumed to be efficient and as such share prices account for all relevant 
information that is freely available to investors thus share prices adjust quickly to any new 
news regarding that share. Therefore the announcement of a BEE deal will be the event and 
as such the information regarding the deal will be quickly incorporated into the share price. 
The event date for this study will be the announcement date; 
 
Secondly, it is assumed that the market had no knowledge of the announcement until the 
actual announcement through the press, or typically in SA through SENS. This allows for the 
impact of the announcement to be evaluated through the changes to the underlying share 
price. Information leakage is a reality on the JSE and this is clearly evident as the market 
adjusts for pending announcement before they are actually made. The leakage of information 
will be primarily due to insider trading and the advancement in information technology and 
globalisation. The advancements in information technology have made information more 
accessible to the public and more difficult for companies to keep secret.  This timing differs 














and Affleck-Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988) show that the impact of this information 
leakage is seen between 10 and 12 weeks prior to announcement. 
 
Lastly, is the methodology assumes that the BEE announcement was the sole reason for any 
change to the underlying share.   
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy and hold abnormal returns are the most 
commonly used methods for calculating abnormal returns with both of these methods 
achieving different outcomes. The BHAR determines whether abnormal returns are achieved 
over a specific period. Thus the method assumes that a share is bought on day 1 and sold on a 
specific date in the future. Thus the abnormal return is the difference between the return on 
the share and the return on the market for this period of time.  CAR’s however determine 
whether abnormal returns are persistently earned because the abnormal return calculation is 
established on a more frequently – daily, weekly or monthly. The primary difference between 
these abnormal returns is that the CAR calculation ignores the effect of compounding 
whereas BHAR’s do not. ('Lyon, 'Barber & 'Tsai, 1999)   
 
Barber and Lyon (1997) in their study analysis of long-run abnormal stock returns, identify 
three biases in their results namely new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases.  
 
New listing bias impacts the evaluation of long term returns. When comparing company 
returns to the market, company returns are positively skewed because the market or 
benchmark includes newly listed companies, companies who at the beginning of their lives, 
on average, perform poorly. Rebalancing bias occurs because benchmark compound returns 
are typically rebalanced monthly whereas the sample company returns are compounded 
without being rebalanced. Skewness bias results in long-run abnormal returns being 
positively skewed. 
 
Their study highlights the fact that all of the methods for calculating abnormal returns suffer 
from these biases. CAR’s are most severely subject to new listing bias, but are also subject to 
rebalancing and skewness bias. BHAR ‘s are most severely subject to skewness bias, but are 
also subject to rebalancing and new listing bias. Although their study advocates the use of the 














this study. The reason for this is the inherent difficulties involved with determining an 
appropriate benchmark for the BHAR method.  
 
The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the return on the share and the risk 
adjusted return on the market. The abnormal return reflects the market’s reaction to the 
arrival of new information and is calculated in equation 3.1.1 below: 
  
(3.1.1)               –            
 
Where; 
      = abnormal return on share i at month t, 
     = the rate of return on the share prices of company i at month t, 
   = the risk free rate (3-month Floating T-bill Rate) 
        = the expected rate of return for company i at month t. 
  
The CAR is calculated by summing all of the abnormal returns for all of the sample 
companies. In determining this, each share is treated as having been purchased at the 
beginning of the month, held throughout the month and subsequently sold at the end of the 
month. This calculation is performed throughout the testing period of -3 to + 3 months and -3 
months to 36 months post event date (See hypothesises below). Average AR’s and CAR’s 
were established over the same periods. Refer to equation 3.1.2 below:  
 
(3.1.2)        ∑     
 
    
 
Where 
       = the cumulative abnormal return for share i at month t, and 

















The choice of the correct and most appropriate benchmark is the most crucial decision when 
selecting methodologies. The use of benchmark is dependent upon the methodology 
employed. It has been shown in many studies that the use of an inappropriate benchmark 
results in incorrect outcomes and poor test statistics. The most common benchmarks used in 
such studies include market indices, asset pricing models (('Kothari & 'Warner, 1997)) 
(('Fama & 'French, 1993)), matched firms ((1997)) (('Wimberley & 'Negash, 2004)) and 
matched portfolios (('Rau & 'Vermaelen, 1996)). 
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) has received frequent exposure in the academic 
literature and has been widely used in practice since the 1960’s. The CAPM suggests that 
returns on financial assets vary according to the level of risk to which that asset is exposed. 
The CAPM model assumes that systematic or market risk, as measured by beta, is the only 
factor affecting the return on a portfolio. This model has be n proven to be too simplistic and 
has a number of limitations such as; the model makes unrealistic assumptions, there is poor 
correlation between betas and share returns and parameters for the model are difficult to 
define. (Damodoran, A) ('Arnold, 2005a) The reasonable investor is assumed to hold a 
diversified portfolio of shares to mitigate firm specific risk.  Thus differences in returns are as 
a direct result of market risk and thus a model taking into account these risks needs to be 
considered.   
 
In order to improve the inadequacies of the simple CAPM further models or benchmarks 
were created to take into account numerous factors in order to establish a model where the 
variables were closer correlated to the returns. Fama and French (1993) in their study 
identified three common systematic risk factors impacting share returns. These included an 
overall market factor and two company factors relating to size and price to book ratios. As a 
result they modified the standard two factor model to encompass the third risk factor. 
Furthering this, researchers, in order to account for the vast number of variables, created 
benchmarks by trying to match like with like and as such created matching portfolios and 
firms. The rationale was to match firms to other firms with similar profiles. However, 
regardless of how well companies are matched, no two firms are the same and as such their 














as they better act as proxies for the market. No model is ever going to take into account all of 
the relevant risk factors facing companies – given the enormity of risk factors facing 
companies.  
 
van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) in their study found the two factor arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT) model, to be superior to that of a single index model, such as the CAPM. Their study 
shows that the use of both the All Gold Index and the Industrial Index as proxies for the 
market is appropriate due to the influence that the Mining and/or Industrial Indices (seldom 
both to the same degree) have on JSE shares. Their paper concludes that the CAPM, 
calculated using the All Share Index as a proxy for the market, did not hold on the JSE. Given 
the re-classification of the JSE in 2000, van Rensburg (2002) updated the work performed in 
their 1997 study. Their updated study showed that the new Financial-Industrial and Resource 
Indices should be used as the proxies in the two factor APT model. 
 
Given the difficulties in determining the most appropriate benchmark, this two factor APT 
model has been used for the purposes of this study.  
 
(3.2.1)                                       
 
Where 
            = are the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) estimates obtained 
from the regression of     with        and      over the sample 
period; and 




















3.3: Hypotheses  
 
This study looks to determine the impact of BEE announcements on shareholder returns. Two 
hypotheses will be tested as follows: 
 
     BEE announcements result in positive share price changes, reflecting positive investor 
sentiment which creates shareholder value. 
 
    BEE announcements result in negative share price changes, reflecting negative investor 
















Chapter 4: Data 
4.1: Extracting the Data 
 
The Ernst & Young (E&Y) ownership database was used as the primary source for 
identifying relevant BEE deals. For the purposes of this study, the E&Y database is 
considered to be complete. This is due to the fact that their database is considered to be the 
most comprehensive M&A database in SA. The accuracy and completeness of the database is 
regularly checked against SENS announcements. This is corroborated by the fact that 
numerous SA studies have used their database as the primary source of M&A data. 
 
The E&Y database includes every transaction that involves changes in a company’s 
shareholding and as such includes acquisition, disposals, formation of joint ventures, share 
buy-backs and unbundling’s. In order to identify BEE transactions the database was sorted 
according to transaction characteristics thereby identifying BEE deals. 
 
The I-Net Bridge and McGregor BFA databases were used as the secondary sources of 
information. The following monthly information was obtained: 
 
 Monthly opening and closing share prices, market capitalisation and dividend yields 
for the sample, over the required 72 month testing period, being 36 months pre-
announcement to 36 months post announcement; 
 
 FINDI and RESI returns for the period 1997 to 2011. This is to ensure that any 
announcements made in 2000 and 2008 had sufficient data for the requirements of the 
OLS regression; and 
 
















4.2: Defining Black Economic Empowerment Announcements 
 
For the purposes of this study not all BEE announcements were considered events. To be 
considered an event, the following criteria needed to be met: 
 
4.2.1. The deal needs to be disclosed in the E&Y database as a BEE transaction. 
E&Y’s classification is based on the SENS announcement and the classification 
as BEE is determined on pertinent details of the transactions such as 
classification of beneficiary as BEE and price details; 
 
4.2.2. The company needs to be listed on the JSE throughout the testing period. Given 
that the testing period is 36 months post announcement, the company will have 
to have been listed for the 36 month period pre-announcement for the OLS 
regression calculations; 
 
4.2.3. All pertinent information relating to the deal is required to be disclosed. This 
would include transaction features or characteristics, pertinent dates, values and 
% shareholding changes; 
 
4.2.4. Transactions were required to be simple once off transactions. Piecemeal 
transactions have been excluded to reduce the impact of confounding events. 
The elimination of piecemeal transactions would ensure that announcement 
abnormal returns are not overstated; 
 
4.2.5. Companies involved in multiple BEE transactions will be excluded thereby 
reducing the number of confounding events; and 
 
4.2.6. All companies who would be considered BEE companies or consortiums (E.g. 
Mvelaphanda, PEU etc.) were excluded from the sample. Due to the fact that 
BEE transactions form part of their core business they were excluded to ensure 
that the results show the financial impact of BEE transactions for non-traditional 
BEE companies. Due to the fact that BEE transactions form part of their core 














therefore eliminated to ensure there are no confounding events. The elimination 
of such companies will ensure that the results will only reflect the share price 
reactions of non-BEE companies.   
 
The total number of BEE announcements per the E&Y database for the testing period 2000 to 
2008 was 919. After adjusting for the above mentioned criteria the final sample was 49. Refer 
to the table below for the different forms of BEE announcements. 
 
 
Figure 3 Classification of the sample 
 
BEE transactions take on many different forms, mainly because the company initiating the 
BEE transaction might be the acquirer or the target. The company initiating the transaction 
might be offering its shares in itself to BEE partners and as such would be classified as the 
target. For the purposes of this study, BEE announcements have been classified into four 
different categories. Although these categories are broadly defined, they take into account the 
material aspects of each transaction. These categories are defined as below: 
 







Type of Transaction 
Disposal: BEE Partner
Acquisition/Formation: BEE Company / Credentials
Employee Share Scheme














2. Acquisitions and formations refer to scenarios where a company’s acquire or create 
new BEE companies or joint ventures. This would include the formation of BEE joint 
ventures; 
 
3. Employee Share Scheme refers to any employee share incentive scheme; and 
 
4. BBBEE – Refers to any transaction that can be defined as broad based. Typically this 






















E&Y captures all of the relevant transaction detail for all M&A (including BEE) transactions. 
This detail would typically include; the acquirer, the target, the seller, transaction description, 
features of the transaction, values, dates and commentaries. On an annual basis, the 
transaction listings were sorted according to the features of the transactions, identifying all of 
the BEE transactions. BEE classification, as described in the previous section, is based on the 
relative SENS announcement; 
 
The remaining BEE transactions were checked thoroughly to ensure that all of the criteria for 
selection were met. This includes: 
 
 Listing - The company initiating the transaction was required to be listed thus non-
listed or undisclosed companies were excluded from the sample; 
 
 Foreign companies and companies listed on the ALTX were excluded; 
 
 Transaction features were required to be clearly expressed to ensure appropriate 
classification; and 
 
 Transactions where BEE companies’ initiated the BEE deal were excluded. 
 
After taking the above into account, the sample was analysed on an annual basis to identify 
companies involved in multiple BEE transactions over the testing period. Any company 
involved in multiple deals within the testing period was excluded to reduce any confounding 
events; and 
 
The remaining sample companies were analysed to ensure that the companies had been listed 
for the required time period. Thus company share price histories were checked according to 
the I-Net Bridge and McGregor BFA databases. Companies who were not listed for the full 















Calculating Abnormal Returns 
 
In order to calculate the beta estimates required by the two factor JSE Model (per equation 
3.2.1), OLS regression was performed on the 73 month abnormal share returns and the 
corresponding monthly excess returns of the FINDI and RESI. The OLS regression was 
completed for the 48 sample transactions with the regression being checked by: 
 
1. Inspection of the computed    numbers to ensure the adequate fit of the model. This 
will be used to establish the unknown parameters for each individual share thus 
ensuring that the returns of a share fit with the returns of the market’s variables; 
 
2. Creation of the normal probability plot to ensure that the parametric assumption of 
normal distribution is met; and  
  
3. Creation of a scatter graph of the predicted versus residual values to ensure that there 
was no signs of multi-collinearity.  
 
The residuals calculated in the OLS regression were used as the AR’s. The individual AR’s 
were aggregated onto one sheet where the sample AAR’s and CAAR’s were calculated.   
 
The control groups for the hypothesis were as follows: 
 
1. Size – Companies were identified as being large cap or small cap companies based on 
their market capitalisation values as at announcement dates. The cut off used by Ward 
and Muller of R3.5 billion was used to determine this split; and 
 
2. Transaction features – Transactions were categorised according to salient features, 

















Tests of significance are performed at all testing dates as per the hypothesis. The Durbin-
Watson statistic was calculated initially to determine whether there were any instances of 
serial correlation or autocorrelation within the sample. The statistic was applied to the 
residuals calculated in the OLS regression for each sample company. The following formula 
was used: 
 
(4.3.1) d = 
∑           
  
    
∑    
 





d  = the Durbin-Watson number that lies between 0 and 4, 
    = the residuals calculated in the regression at time t, and 
T  = is the number of observations. 
 
The Durbin-Watson number always lies between 0 and 4, with 2 indicating no serial 
correlation. A number smaller than 2 indicates positive correlation whereas a number greater 
than 2 indicates negative correlation. Positive or negative correlation highlights results that 
might be positively or negatively skewed. 
 
Parametric testing, through the use of standard t-stat testing, was used to determine the 
statistical inference. T-Statistic testing requires that the sample population be normally 
distributed. Although AAR tend not to be normally distributed ('Wimberley & 'Negash, 
2004), the Central Limits Theorem states that where a sample is greater than 30, the 
calculated means will approximate a normal distribution ('Underhill & 'Bradfield, 1998). 
Thus the t-test will be used via the following formula 6. 
 
(6)     
 ̅    ̅ 





        = is the standard deviation of the sample and 














Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 Hypothesis 1: 
 
The hypothesis tests whether or not BEE announcements result in positive or negative share 
price changes around the announcement date, reflecting either positive or negative investor 
sentiment. The long term CAAR, to 36 months post announcement, will be evaluated to 
determine the value proposition of BEE deals. 
 




Figure 4 Event Date to +12 months CAAR plot 
 
Figure 4 shows the CAAR plot for the uncontrolled full sample for the event period, being 
announcement month to +12 months. The CAAR plot reaches CAAR’s of 0.84%, 1.35% and 
2.52% over the announcement period, +3, and +12 months respectively. The positivity of the 
plot indicates a positive investor sentiment driven by positive price changes in the underlying 
share. The growth in the CAAR from time announcement to +3 months indicates that the 
market anticipates the impending BEE deals prior to actual announcement date. This is 
consistent with other South African M&A studies which suggest that the market on average 
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Affleck-Graves and Smale ((1988) and Affleck-Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988) confirm 
that market anticipation occurs between 12 and 13 weeks prior to announcement. This would 
seem to suggest that information regarding the BEE transaction is leaked early however given 
the logistical difficulties in structuring BEE deals this would be expected. CAAR’s remain 
positive over the event period peaking at month +9 at 4.08%. At month +9 the CAAR plot 
shifts downwards and becomes negative at month +10 at -1.48%. The general downward shift 
in returns indicates that the market is revising the expectations set at announcement date. This 
is in line with most M&A work.  
 
The positivity of the CAAR’s around the announcement date to month +12 for both event 

















Large Cap vs. Small Cap 
 
The full sample of BEE announcements was controlled for size where companies were 
categorised as either small or large cap companies. This distinction was made according to 
the relevant market capitalisation values as at announcement date, with R3.5 billion being the 
cut off. Ward and Muller (2010) in their study controlled for size based on the same criteria. 




Figure 5 Size Controlled -3 to +12 Month CAAR plot 
 
Figure 5 plots the CAAR for both large and small cap companies over the event period to +12 
months. Overall, regardless of size CAAR’s are positive around the announcement date 
confirming that investor sentiment is positive. Large cap companies show CAAR’s for the 
announcement, +3 and +12 months periods of -0.04%, -0.08% and -1.63% respectively. 
Small cap companies show CAAR’s for the announcement, +3 and +12 month periods of 
1.73%, 3.56% and 6.68% respectively. Small cap CAAR’s consistently out-perform large cap 
CAAR’s and are positive throughout the period to +12 months, peaking at month +7 at 
9.46%. Large cap CAAR’s peak at month+1 at 1.54% where thereafter there is a downward 
trend with CAAR’s becoming consistently negative from month +5. These findings are in 
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The superior performance of small cap companies can be attributed to the following factors: 
Firstly, the proportional change, both in terms of the number of shares and the Rand value, is 
considerably larger for smaller cap companies. Thus the impact of the BEE announcement 
would have a bigger proportional impact on the smaller companies and be more visible. 
Secondly large cap companies are typically owned by institutional funders such as pension 
funds and private equity firms. Such funders typically buy big blocks of shares less 
frequently looking to value invest over longer periods of time. This strategy reduces the 
marketability and movement of shares around announcement date and as such dampens price 
movements. Thirdly institutional funders are typically risk adverse and the “flight to quality” 
results in them investing in more stable large cap firms. BEE transactions are typically seen 
as being overly expensive and having a dilutive effect on the underlying shares. Thus 
























Transaction Type: Disposals, Acquisitions, Employee Share Scheme (ESS) and BBBEE 
 
 
Figure 6 Transaction Type Event Date to +12 month CAAR plot 
 
Figure 6 shows the CAAR plots for the four different categories of transactions. With the 
exception of ESS’s, all transaction categories show positive CAAR’s around the 
announcement period.  
 
ESS schemes perform the worst with CAAR’s becoming negative from announcement 
month. This indicates that investors view such transactions as being overly costly whilst 
adding no real benefit. Employee incentive schemes are viewed as a passive means of BEE 
implementation with the inherent discount being too big and the inherent costs of 
implementing such schemes being too costly. ESS CAAR’s for the announcement, +3 and 
+12 month periods are -3.76*%, -12.70*% and -20.45%* respectively. ESS CAAR’s reach a 
minimum of -29.29*% in month +10. 
 
Acquisition CAAR’s are consistently positive over the event period to +12 months with the 
announcement, +3, and +12 months CAAR’s reaching -3.56%, 1.54% and 6.02% 
respectively. There appears to be a positive trend in CAAR’s post announcement, although 
there is a short term dip in CAAR’s between months +1 and +3. The dip in short term 
CAAR’s might be as a result of increased inefficiencies due to organisational restructuring 
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businesses or business units are acquired thus making benefits measurable and as such the 
inherent synergies quantifiable. The acquisition CAAR plot is positive for the majority of the 
period to +12 months.   
 
BBEEE and disposal transactions are identical in structure. The only difference being that 
BBBEE schemes require a broad base of beneficiaries. Thus they will be evaluated together. 
BBBEE schemes tend to show more positive CAAR’s than that of disposals over the event 
period to +12 months. BBBEE CAAR’s show CAAR’s for the announcement, +3 and +12 
months of -1.48*%, 5.54*% and 11.95*% respectively. Disposal CAAR’s over the same 
periods were 3.67%, 3.77% and 6.06% respectively. The superior performance of broad 
based schemes tends to indicate that public perception of broad based schemes is more 
positive. As previously noted, the early pitfall of BEE implementation was that the benefit 
only served the politically connected elite.  
 
*The CAAR’s were found to be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Refer to 





















Figure 7 Event Date to +36 CAAR plot 
 
Figure 7 shows the CAAR plot for the full sample for the event period to +36 months post 
announcement. The CAAR plot reaches a peak of 4.08% in month +9, where there after there 
appears to be a general downward shift in returns. This downward shift reflects the revision 
of the market’s original expectations. There appears to be a spike in CAAR’s between +10 
and +13 months. This spike in returns might be generated by material economic information 
such as, the winning of big tenders that would renew investor confidence. Although the BEE 
deal would improve a company’s BEE credentials, there would be a definite lag between the 
deal and the fruition of the benefits. Thus although the share price would reflect the present 
value of future cash flows, not all of the cash flows might be apparent at announcement date, 
resulting in the share price reaction.  
 
CAAR’s remain positive until month +18 where they remain at negative levels reaching +24 
and +36 month CAAR’s of -4.91% and -14.02% respectively. The is a general downward 
shift in returns from month +9 where the plot becomes and remains negative from month 
+18. It is evident from this that without controlling for size or transaction type, BEE deals 
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Large Cap vs. Small Cap 
 
 
Figure 8 Size Controlled Event Date to +36 month CAAR plot 
 
Figure 8 shows the size controlled CAAR plot for the event period to +36 months for both 
large and small cap companies. Large cap companies reach CAAR’s at months +12, +24 and 
+36 of -1.63%, -8.90% and -15.90*% respectively. CAAR’s peak at 1.54% at +1 month 
where there after there appears to be a downward trend in returns. Large cap CAAR’s are 
negative from month +5 onwards indicating that large cap companies involved in BEE deals 
do not create value for the shareholder over the long term. 
 
Small cap companies reach CAAR’s at months +12, +24 and +36 of 6.68%, -0.92% and -
12.15% respectively.  CAAR’s peak later at 12.04% at month +16 where there after there is a 
decrease in CAAR’s. CAAR’s become and remain negative from month +24 where they 
reach a minimum of -12.15% at month +36. CAAR’s are positive over the period -1 to +24 
months and as such indicate that small cap companies involved in BEE deals create value for 
the shareholder over the long term. Both small and large cap companies show the same spike 
in results at month +10 as per the full sample thus the spike is not driven by size.  
 
It is evident that whilst the plots for both small and large cap companies tend to move in 
tandem, small cap companies are on average more positive. The primary driver of the small 
cap’s superior returns relates to the points mention earlier in this section where; the 























more visible for small cap companies and that the investors of large cap companies trade less 
frequently in the underlying shares thus minimising the impact of announcements on share 
prices. Smaller companies are also less entrenched in their markets than larger cap companies 
and as such the potential benefits are thus that much bigger. The superiority of small cap 
CAAR’s is consistent with the findings of Ward and Muller. 
 
*Note that the CAAR is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level - refer to tables 















Transaction Type: Disposals, Acquisitions, ESS and BBBEE 
 
 
Figure 9 Transaction Type Event Date to +36 month CAAR plot 
 
Figure shows the CAAR plots controlled for the type of transaction over the event period to 
+36 months. It is clearly evident that ESS transactions destroy value over the long term. 
Returns are negative from announcement and reach CAAR’s at months +12, +24 and +36 
months of -20.45*%, -31.27*% and -23.02*% respectively. This highlights the fact that the 
market considers ESS to be excessively costly.  
 
The CAAR’s of disposals and BBBEE deals have similar characteristics - which is 
understandable given their structural similarities. The CAAR plot of BBBEE schemes 
however is more positive over the period -3 to +21 months. This indicates that the market has 
a more positive outlook on and favours broad based schemes. Although both earn positive 
CAAR’s, BBBEE creates more value over the same time period. BBBEE schemes earn 
CAAR’s at the months of +12, +24 and +36 of 11.95*%, -11.50*% and -27.64*% 
respectively. BBBEE CAAR’s peak at 18.88*% at +11 months where there after there 
appears to be a downward trend in returns. It must be noted that the BBBEE control group 
suffers from a small sample size. Disposals earn CAAR’s at the months +12, +24 and +36 of 
6.06%, -4.52% and -16.00% respectively. Disposal CAAR’s peak at 8.12% at +9 months 
where there after there appears to be a downward trend in returns. BBBEE CAAR’s decrease 























BEE consortium outweigh the benefits of a public offering. This might also indicate that the 
companies’ good public image of the initial offering has eroded.   
 
Acquisitions clearly outperform all the other types of transactions and as such create value 
over the long term. Acquisition CAAR’s remain positive throughout the testing period 
reaching CAAR’s at +12, +24 and +36 months of 6.02%, 16.68% and 4.42% respectively. 
The CAAR peaks at 25.77% in month +22 where thereafter there is a downward shift in 
returns. Investors view acquisitions as the most sustainable form of BEE deal over the long 
term. This indicates that over and above the improved BEE credentials there is also a 
measurable increase in operations. The fact that the operations are measurable means that 
investors are easier able to analyse the impact of the BEE deal. With all the other form of 
deals this is not the case.   
 
 
Figure 10 Small Cap vs. Acquisitions Event Date to +36 month CAAR plot 
 
Figure 10 shows the CAAR plots of both small cap companies and companies involved in 
acquisitions as a means of BEE implementation. The acquisition CAAR plot shows very 
similar characteristics to that of the small cap companies and would indicate that small cap 
companies tend to focus on the acquisitions or formations of BEE companies or joint 
ventures as their primary method of BEE implementation. This makes sense in that smaller 
companies would prefer not to transfer ownership of their companies in order to obtain higher 



























*Note that the CAAR’s are statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.  
 
Tests of significance were performed on the CAAR, to determine if the expected CAAR was 
significantly different from zero. Refer to the tables below which include an analysis of the 










Statistical Testing – Control Groups 
Period Disposals Acquisitions ESS BBBEE 
Months CAAR P Value CAAR P Value CAAR P Value CAAR P Value 
0 to +3 3.77% 0.242 1.54% 0.748 -12.70% 0.000* 5.54% 0.000* 
0 to +12 6.06% 0.297 6.02% 0.331 -20.45% 0.000* 11.95% 0.000* 
0 to+24 -4.52% 0.578 16.68% 0.170 -31.27% 0.000* -11.50% 0.004* 
0 to +36 -16.00% 0.113 4.42% 0.741 -20.34% 0.000* -27.64% 0.000* 




Statistical Testing – Control Groups 
Period Full Sample Large Cap Small Cap 
Months CAAR P Value CAAR P Value CAAR P Value 
0 to +3 1.35% 0.684 -0.87% 0.202 3.56% 0.364 
0 to +12 2.52% 0.644 -1.63% 0.729 6.68% 0.279 
0 to+24 -4.91% 0.552 -8.90% 0.021 -0.92% 0.934 
0 to +36 -14.02% 0.149 -15.90% 0.0001* -12.15% 0.360 














Chapter 6: Conclusion: 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the financial impact of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) announcements on company shareholders. The hypothesis tested 
whether or not BEE announcements resulted in positive or negative share price changes 
around the announcement date, reflecting either positive or negative investor sentiment. The 
longer term CAAR was evaluated to determine whether or not BEE announcements created 
or destroyed value over the long term (Announcement date to +36 months). This would 
suggest that initial investor sentiment regarding the deal was correct. 
 
The results all show a significant spike in CAAR’s around the announcement dates which 
indicates that the market had anticipated the deal the prior to the actual announcement. This 
timing supports the findings of Van den Honert, Barr, Affleck-Graves and Smale ((1988) and  
Affleck-Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988) who all confirm that JSE’s anticipation occurs 
between 12 and 13 weeks prior to announcement.. 
 
The analysis of the full sample suggests that investor sentiment is positive regarding BEE 
announcements as is seen by the positive CAAR’s at event date of 0.84% and months +12 of 
2.52%. This is in line with the findings of Ward and Muller whose study reflected positive 
CAAR’s from the event date to +6 months of approximately 10%. The results are also in line 
with the findings of Allessandri, Black & Jackson (2009) whose study indicated event period 
CAAR’s of 2.4%. However, when controlling for size and transaction type the degree of 
positivity varies.  
 
Small cap companies outperform large cap companies. The results suggest that small cap 
companies tend to favour acquisitions as a means of improving their BEE credentials. Thus 
the better results of small cap companies is driven by the fact that acquisitions create the most 
value over the long term, with a 36 month CAAR of 4.42%. This is in line with the findings 
of Ward and Muller whose study indicates that long term value applied to smaller companies 
with market capitalization of less than R3.5billion. A possible reason for this long term value 
creation is that the value from an acquisition is measurable and as such makes the BEE 














improved BEE credential, but also from the prospects of increased operations. The fact that 
large companies are so entrenched in their respective markets limits their ability to benefit 
from further BEE implementation.  
 
ESS schemes are considered value destroying as ESS earn negative CAAR’s throughout the 
testing period to +36 months. Investors see such transactions as being costly, dilutive to 
shareholders and at the very least non-value enhancing.   
 
The CAAR plots of both disposals and BBBEE share many similarities and this is expected 
because in fundamental structure they are the same. They both are “disposals” however it is 
only their beneficiaries that differ because BBBEE are restricted to beneficiaries that are 
broad based. The CAAR plot of BBBEE schemes however is more positive over the event 
period to +21 months. Although both earn positive CAAR’s, BBBEE creates more value over 
the same time period. This indicates that the market has a more positive outlook on and 
rewards companies that engage in broad based schemes. This is in contrast to the 1990’s 
where BEE schemes resulted in the wealth creation of the politically connected business. 
 
In summary it is evident that the market has a positive sentiment regarding BEE deals around 
the announcement date. The downward trend of post-acquisition abnormal returns suggests 
that the initial expectations for the value creation of BEE were overstated. It appears that 
there is an overstated hype driven by an all talk no action type approach to BEE investment 
decisions. Companies should look to employ an investment type approach only when looking 
to invest in BEE. This will ensure that BEE commitments conform with current business 




As is the case with any long term event studies conducted in RSA, there are a number of 
restrictive considerations that need to be taken into account: 
 
1. Long term studies suffer severely from confounding events and as such it remains 















2. The testing period of 2000 to 2008 is subject to timing bias. This is because this 
period suffered two economic recessions with a strong bull run in between. The 
contrasting economic climate would result in increases in the variances of results; and 
 
3. The fact that BEE is a relatively new phenomenon puts pressure on sample sizes and 




Taking into account the above limitations it would be suggested that similar hypothesise be 
tested over time with larger populations. This will result in more statistically significant 
results. It would also be interesting to analyse the results on an annual basis and as such 
















Appendix A: Final Sample  
 
BEE Company JSE Code Announcement Date Transaction Type 
Caxton Publishers CAT 24/02/2000 Disposal 
Anglo American Platinum AMS 31/07/2001 Acquisition 
Forim Holdings FOM 31/10/2001 Disposal 
SA Breweries SAB 29/11/2001 Disposal 
Dimension Data DDT 17/10/2002 Disposal 
Absa Group  ASA 24/11/2003 Disposal 
Argent Industrial ART 03/06/2004 Acquisition 
Hosken Consolidated 
Investment 
HCI 09/07/2004 Acquisition 
Howden Africa Holdings HWN 27/08/2004 Disposal 
FirstRand FSR 04/11/2004 BBBEE 
Old Mutual PLC OML 27/01/2005 Acquisition 
Imperial Holdings IPL 07/04/2005 BBBEE 
Simmer & Jack SIM 25/07/2005 Disposal 
Digicore Holdings DGC 06/09/2005 Disposal 
Thabex Holdings TBX 30/11/2005 Acquisition 
Acucap Properties ACP 13/02/2006 Disposal 
Metropolitan Holdings MMI 22/02/2006 Disposal 
ELB Engineering ELR 17/03/2006 Disposal 
Glenrand MIB GMB  21/03/2006 Disposal 
Winhold WNH 23/03/2006 Disposal 
Massmart Holdings MSM 16/05/2006 ESS 
Oceana Group OCE 26/06/2006 ESS 
Comair  COM 25/07/2006 Disposal 
PSG Group PSG 31/08/2006 ESS 
Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon WBO 12/09/2006 Disposal 
Anglo Gold Ashanti ANG 03/10/2006 ESS 
DRD Gold  DRD 30/10/2006 ESS / Disposal 
York Timber YRK 06/11/2006 Disposal 
Combined Motor Holdings CMH 16/11/2006 Disposal 
Reunert RLO 21/11/2006 ESS 
Santam SNT 28/02/2007 Disposal 
Pangbourne Properties PAP 05/03/2007 Disposal 
Gold Reef Resorts GDF 09/03/2007 Disposal 
Italtile ITE 11/05/2007 Disposal 
Woolworths Holdings WHL 21/05/2007 ESS 
Sasol SOL 11/09/2007 BBBEE 
















BEE Company JSE Code Announcement Date Transaction Type 
Stella Vista Technologies SLL 19/02/2008 Disposal 
Rainbow Chicken RBW 20/02/2008 Disposal 
Anglo American Platinum AMS 10/03/2008 ESS 
Assore ASR 12/03/2008 Disposal 
Network Healthcare 
Holdings 
NTC 12/03/2008 Disposal 
Absa Group  ASA 20/03/2008 Acquisition 
Business Connexion Group BCX 20/03/2008 Acquisition 
Nedbank Group NED 28/03/2008 ESS 
Ceramic Industries CRM 10/06/2008 Disposal 
Tawana Resources TAW 17/06/2008 Acquisition 
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